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Introduction
The human and social cost of the hiV pandemic – more than 60 million people have been infected with hiV and nearly 30 mil-
lion people have died of hiV-related causes1 – ought to make a strong enough case for access to treatment for all who need 
it. Furthermore, the right to health is present in several legally binding international human rights treaties,2 in select regional 
treaties,3 and in numerous national constitutions.4 The right to health has been interpreted broadly to include a right to treat-
ment and, more specifically, a right of access to medicines. 
in the context of hiV, as specified in the international Guidelines on hiV/aiDs and human rights issued jointly by UnaiDs and the 
United nations high commissioner for human rights and promulgated specifically “to assist states in translating international hu-
man rights norms into practical observance in the context of hiV”, the right of access to essential medicines – among other things 
– means providing access to appropriate diagnostics including viral load and other point-of-care tests and to safe, easy-to-use 
and efficacious antiretrovirals (arVs), medicines to treat opportunistic infections and co-morbidities (including tuberculosis, viral 
hepatitis), and analgesics for palliative care. in the emerging prevention context, it will mean providing access to improved arVs 
to prevent vertical transmission and promising medicines for topical and oral pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis.5
The realization of access to medicines as a human right is heavily dependent on the legal framework applicable to the production 
and distribution of medicines, including intellectual property rights (iPrs). The adoption of the agreement on Trade-related as-
pects of intellectual Property rights (the TriPs agreement) in 1994 changed dramatically the international landscape with regard 
to iPrs, particularly in relation to access to medicines. Before the TriPs agreement came into force, countries had more freedom 
to design their national iPr regimes under the Paris convention for the Protection of industrial Property. They could exclude from 
protection entire fields of technology, determine the patent term and define many other aspects of such regimes. 
as a result, in the pre-TriPs era most developing and some developed countries excluded pharmaceutical products from patent 
protection. For instance, an amendment in 1969 to the Brazilian legislation declared pharmaceutical products and processes 
non-patentable. in 1970, india implemented a similar policy that eventually led to the development of a strong local pharma-
ceutical sector, which nowadays supplies more than 80 percent of antiretrovirals used in developing countries. Moreover, in the 
second half of the 1970s, developing countries attempted, in line with new perspectives on social and economic development, 
1  UnaiDs (2010) Report on the global AIDS epidemic, UnaiDs, Geneva. summary available at: http://www.unaids.org/documents/20101123_Fs_Global_
em_en.pdf.
2  These include the Universal Declaration of human rights, G.a. res. 217 (iii) a, and Un Doc. a/res/217(iii), art. 25 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at: http://www.
un.org/en/documents/udhr/, the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, G.a. res. 2200a (XXi), 21 U.n.Gaor supp. (no. 16) at 49, U.n. 
Doc. a/6316, art. 12 (1966), 993 U.n.T.s. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976. For a fuller listing of relevant treaties and related instruments, see ohchr & Who 
(2008) Right to Health: Fact Sheet 31, Who, Geneva. available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet31.pdf. 
3  For instance, the american Declaration of the rights and Duties of Man (1948), o.a.s. res. XXX, adopted by the ninth international conference of ameri-
can states, o.a.s. official record oea/ser. l/V1.4 rev. (1965); american convention on human rights (1969), o.a.s. Treaty service no. 36, o.a.s. official record 
oea/ser. K/XVi/1.1 doc. 65 rev. 1 corr. 2 (1979); additional Protocol to the american convention on human rights in the area of economic, social and cultural 
rights (1988), art. 10, 28 i.l.M. 156, 164; organization of african Unity (1981), Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, oaU Doc. caB/leG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 
i.l.M. 58 (1982).
4  international commission of Jurists, courts and the legal enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights (2008), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/category,PolicY, hanDBooK,,4a7840562,0.html.
5  a more detailed discussion on the right to health and access to hiV treatment is available in Tenu avafia and Brook Baker, Laws and Practices that facilitate 
or impede HIV-related treatment access, Working Paper 13, prepared for the First Meeting of the Global commission on hiV and the law. 
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to move forward a revision of the Paris convention that would have provided more flexibility in patent legislation, particularly 
in the area of compulsory licences. This initiative, however, was defeated; a well-articulated counter-offensive by developed 
countries led to the negotiation of standards on iPrs as an item of the trade agenda. 
With the incorporation of the TriPs agreement as one of the multilateral agreements of the World Trade organization (WTo), 
Members of the WTo became bound to observe a set of minimum standards of iPrs protection. Failure to do so may lead 
to trade retaliations that may affect their main export products. one of these minimum standards is the obligation to grant 
patents in all fields of technology. hence, being a Member of the WTo (which is critical for most countries to ensure access to 
foreign markets) became incompatible with the legal models based on the non-patentability of pharmaceuticals (as applied in 
a large majority of developing and some developed countries till then), short terms of patent protection6 and other measures 
aimed at promoting competition in the pharmaceutical market as a means to promote access to affordable medicines. 
While the TriPs agreement was proposed to address iPrs as a  ‘trade-related issue’, the rules it introduced have had far-reaching 
implications, well beyond the context in which they were negotiated and adopted. in particular, the right to exclusively exploit 
protected processes and products, thereby excluding any potential competition, may conflict with the fundamental right to 
health, one manifestation of which is the access to medicines needed by all. The paradigmatic change generated by the TriPs 
agreement has consequently led to calls for a reconsideration of the relationship between iPrs and the right to health (see 
further elaboration on this issue below), since a large part of the world population still lacks access to a sustainable supply of 
medicines needed to treat hiV and other diseases, and that iPrs may aggravate rather than improve this situation.7
abundant literature and many authoritative reports8 have noted that the TriPs agreement allows for what have been termed 
‘TriPs flexibilities’. such flexibilities enable governments to mitigate, by enacting  appropriate legislation and regulations, the 
negative impact that iPrs may have on the realization of the right to health. however, soon after the adoption of the agreement 
important challenges to the use of such flexibilities raised concerns from developing countries about constraints on the effec-
tive room for manoeuvre available for countries seeking to protect public health.
This became abundantly clear when, despite the gravity of the hiV pandemic in sub-saharan african countries, in 1998 multina-
tional pharmaceutical companies legally challenged the implementation of TriPs-compatible measures (parallel importation 
in particular) by the south african government, in a bitter court dispute that lasted approximately for three years and ended 
only after a massive domestic and international campaign mounted in support of the government by treatment activists and 
several organizations.9 This did not prevent the Us government from placing south africa on its 301 special Watch list, sus-
pending certain trade advantages and employing persistent diplomatic pressure to urge repeal of the act. The matter was only 
6  in india, for instance, patents for pharmaceutical products were not allowed, and process patents in that field could be granted for seven years only.
7  although iPrs may create incentives for innovation in the pharmaceutical field, such innovation is irrelevant from a public health perspective if it is not 
accessible and affordable to patients in need of treatment.
8 several documents, particularly by Who, UncTaD and UnDP, as well as extensive academic work and nGo statements highlighted the flexibility allowed 
by the TriPs agreement in areas such as exceptions to patent rights, parallel imports and compulsory licensing. see, for example, Who, Globalization and ac-
cess to Drugs - health economics and Drugs series, no. 007, available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jwhozip35e/3.7.1.html; German Velásquez , 
carlos correa and Xavier seuba (2011) iPr, r&D, human rights and access to Medicines. an annotated and selected Bibliography, south centre, Geneva.
9    see, for example, William W. Fisher iii and cyrill P. rigamonti (2005) The south africa aiDs controversy. a case study in Patent law and Policy, harvard 
law school, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/south%20africa.pdf.
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resolved when former President clinton adopted an executive order preventing the United states Trade representative (UsTr) 
from interfering with attempts by sub-saharan african countries to use TriPs flexibilities to increase access to medicines.10 
Meanwhile, a dispute arose between the United states and Brazil which resulted in the dispute settlement mechanism of the 
WTo being invoked on the allegation that the Brazilian regulations for the grant of compulsory licences were in violation of the 
TriPs agreement. The dispute was eventually resolved through a ‘settlement agreement’ between the parties, resulting in the 
Us withdrawing its complaint.11.12 
although one of the stated goals of the TriPs agreement was “to reduce tensions arising from intellectual property protection”,13 
the possible conflict (as illustrated by the above-mentioned disputes) between such protection and essential public health 
objectives—particularly access to medicines—moved the african Group, supported by other developing countries and civil so-
ciety, to request the council for TriPs to specifically consider the relationship between the TriPs agreement and public health 
in general, and access to medicines more specifically. Two special sessions on the matter were held by the TriPs council and, as 
a result of this process, developing countries sought the adoption of a WTo Declaration on the policy space available under the 
TriPs agreement to protect public health. importantly, the Declaration was aimed not at the creation of such policy space, but 
instead confirming the right of WTo Member states to make effective use of existing TriPs flexibilities. 
The discussion of this proposed Declaration was one of the outstanding issues at the 4th WTo Ministerial conference (Doha, 9–14 
november 2001),14 which launched a new round of trade negotiations on a broad range of issues. after protracted negotiations, 
the conference adopted the ‘Declaration on the TriPs agreement and Public health’ (hereinafter ‘the Doha Declaration’). 15 
This paper examines the implications of the Doha Declaration on the right to health, and some of its repercussions on countries 
that have utilized some of the flexibilities confirmed by the Doha Declaration. The possible implications of using TriPs flexibili-
ties to increase access to products for hiV-related co-infections and for non-communicable diseases (ncDs) are also discussed, 
followed by some final reflections.
10  executive order 13155 (10 May 2000).
11   a Joint communication issued by the Usa and Brazil on 25 June 2001 in essence stated that Brazil would give the Usa adequate notice and consult before 
issuing a compulsory licence based on article 68.
12  see, for example, James love (2011) What the 2001 Doha Declaration changed, Kei, available at http://keionline.org/node/1267. see also, Brook Baker 
and Tenu avafia (2011) The evolution of iPrs from humble Beginnings to the Modern Day TriPs-plus era: implications for Treatment access, Paper prepared 
for the Third Meeting of the Technical advisory Group, Global commission on hiV and the law, UnDP, new York, Usa.
13  see Preamble of the TriPs agreement.
14  on the opening day of the conference, the Director General of WTo indicated that agreement on public health and TriPs was the “deal breaker” of a new 
WTo round. Pascal lamy, then the eU commissioner for Trade, stated “... we must also find the right mix of trade and other policies — consider the passion sur-
rounding our debate of TriPs and access to Medicines, which has risen so dramatically to become a clearly defining issue for us this week, and rightly so.”
15  Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Doha WTo Ministerial 2001, WT/Min(01)/Dec/2, 20 november 2001, available at: http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm.
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content of the Doha Declaration
The adoption of the Doha Declaration was a significant achievement for developing countries. it recognized the ‘gravity’ of the 
public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries (lDcs), especially those resulting from hiV, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics. however, the Declaration is not limited to those diseases and epidemics, but applies 
to any disease, including ncDs. 
While acknowledging the role of intellectual property protection “for the development of new medicines”, the Declaration 
specifically recognizes concerns about its effects on prices. a key element of the Declaration is contained in its Paragraph 4, 
according to which:
We agree that the TriPs agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect 
public health. accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TriPs agreement, we affirm that the agreement 
can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTo Members’ right to protect public 
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
in this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTo Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TriPs agreement, 
which provide flexibility for this purpose.
This Paragraph made it clear that the main or sole objective of the TriPs agreement cannot be deemed to be the satisfaction 
of the private interests of right owners, but the realization of public interests that, in the case of health, include ”access to medi-
cines for all”. 
More specifically, Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration confirmed some of the flexibilities available under the TriPs agreement, 
notably those relating to parallel imports and compulsory licences:
5. accordingly and in the light of Paragraph 4 above, while maintaining our commitments in the TriPs agreement, we 
recognize that these flexibilities include:
a. in applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision of the TriPs agreement 
shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and 
principles.
b. each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which 
such licences are granted.
c.  each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to hiV/aiDs, tuberculosis, malaria and 
other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.
d. The effect of the provisions in the TriPs agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights 
is to leave each Member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the MFn 
and national treatment provisions of articles 3 and 4.
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The wording of the chapeau of Paragraph 5 (“these flexibilities include”) makes it clear that it contains an illustrative rather than 
a comprehensive list of such flexibilities.
Under article 31 of the TriPs agreement a compulsory licence can be granted by a government, inter alia, to allow a third party 
to produce a generic version of a patented pharmaceutical product without the authorization of the patent holder, in so do-
ing allowing low-price generic pharmaceuticals to be produced locally or imported from abroad. The confirmation that each 
Member “has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are 
granted” has particular significance. not only had attempts by countries to use TriPs flexibilities been obstructed as the cases 
against south africa and Brazil indicate, but the United states also signed bilateral trade agreements with a number of devel-
oping countries (e.g. Jordan,16 sri lanka17) limiting such grounds to a narrow set of circumstances. in the case of Jordan, such 
circumstances were limited to “(a) remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive; 
(b) in cases of public non-commercial use or in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, 
provided that such use is limited to use by government entities or legal entities acting under the authority of a government; or 
(c) on the ground of failure to meet working requirements, provided that importation shall constitute working” (article 4.20).18
in addition to the policy space afforded by the existence of compulsory licensing provisions, the ”exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights” can also assist countries seeking to ensure access to affordable medicines. exhaustion of rights refers to in-
stances where products produced under protection of a patent (or trade mark or copyright) in one market are subsequently 
exported to a second market and placed on that market without the authorization of the owner of the patent. This enhances 
market competition between sources of the same products, which tends to drive down prices. Under article 6 of the TriPs 
agreement, countries are free to adopt an international, regional or national exhaustion of rights regime. international exhaus-
tion allows countries to parallel import from any other country, while regional exhaustion of rights restricts parallel importation 
to products originating in other members of a regional trade or economic agreement. national exhaustion of rights excludes 
parallel importation.19
a number of other flexibilities, not explicitly mentioned in Paragraph 5 above are relevant to the protection of public health. 
as mentioned previously, the TriPs agreement changed the international patent regime by obliging WTo Members to make 
patents available for any inventions, including both product and processes, regardless of the field of technology, provided that 
they meet the patentability criteria of being new, involving an inventive step and being capable of industrial application. how-
ever, one crucial flexibility is the ability of a WTo Member to determine for itself what an ‘invention’ is and how the patentability 
requirements (novelty, inventive step, industrial applicability) are to be applied to decisions on whether to grant or not grant 
a patent. in the area of pharmaceuticals, in particular, it is of great significance to distinguish between what has been invented 
16  see http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1041. 
17  see http://lists.essential.org/pharm-policy/msg00262.html. 
18  in the case of the bilateral Us–sri lanka agreement, the only permitted grounds for the grant of a compulsory licence would be (1) to remedy an adju-
dicated violation of competition laws, (2) to address, only during its existence, a declared national emergency, and (3) to enable compliance with national air 
pollutant standards, where compulsory licences are essential to such compliance.
19    Duncan Matthews and Viviana Munoz-Tellez (2007) ‘Parallel Trade: a User’s Guide’, in anatole Krattiger, richard nelsen Mahoney et al. (eds.) intellectual 
Property Management in health and agriculture innovation: a handbook of Best Practices, Mihr, oxford, UK and PiPra, Davis, Usa, p. 1429.
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or discovered, and to rigorously apply such requirements to avoid the proliferation of patents on minor developments that 
may be used to block legitimate competition.20 other flexibilities are provisions for pre- and post-grant opposition and strict 
disclosure standards.
articles 27.3(a) and 30 of the TriPs agreement provide further public health-related flexibilities. They allow WTo Members to 
exclude from patentability therapeutic, surgical and diagnostic methods, and to provide for exceptions to rights conferred by a 
patent including for research and experimentation, prior use and early working (often known as ‘the Bolar exception’).21
another important flexibility relates to the extent of protection conferred to “test data” under article 39.3 of the TriPs agreement. 
interpreted in accordance with the Vienna convention on the law of the Treaties (articles 31 and 32), this provision only requires 
protection under the discipline of unfair competition.22 it does not oblige WTo Members to provide for a period of exclusivity, as 
advocated for and implemented by some developed countries and required by the United states, the european Union (eU) and 
the european Free Trade association (eFTa) in free trade agreements (FTas) signed with a number of developing countries.23
Further, the Doha Declaration clarified that “public health crises” can represent “a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency”. an ‘emergency’ may be either a short-term problem, or a long-lasting situation. importantly, the Doha Declara-
tion makes it clear that the determination of when such circumstances exist is a matter of decision by the WTo Member affected.
The Doha Declaration also recognized, in its Paragraph 6, the limitations that countries with no or insufficient manufacturing 
capacity in pharmaceuticals would face to use compulsory licences to address public health needs. although the provisions 
on compulsory licensing permit generic drug companies to manufacture a patented product without the authorization of the 
right holder, article 31(f ) of the TriPs agreement also requires that medicines produced under compulsory licence conditions 
should be predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the WTo Member authorizing such use. This constitutes a 
major problem for WTo Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector, since these 
countries would be unable to make effective use of compulsory licensing because an exporting producer might be limited in 
the quantity of medicines it could export pursuant to a compulsory licence.24 Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on TriPs and Pub-
lic health recognized this problem and instructed the council for TriPs to find “an expeditious solution” to it.
after protracted and often acrimonious negotiations, on 30 august 2003, WTo Members agreed on a temporary waiver 
to article 31(f ) and (h) to allow for the export of medicines under compulsory licences. however, the 30 august Decision 
involved only a temporary waiver. on 6 December 2005 an amendment to the TriPs agreement was agreed, to make perma-
20  see, for example, sudip chaudhuri, chan Park and K. M. Gopakumar (2010) Five Years into the Product Patent regime: india’s response, UnDP, new York. 
available at: http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s17761en/s17761en.pdf; carlos correa (2011) Pharmaceutical innovation, incremental Patent-
ing and compulsory licensing, research Paper no. 41, south centre, Geneva. available at: http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&v
iew=article&id=1601%3apharmaceutical-innovation-incremental-patenting-and-compulsory-licensing&catid=41%3ainnovation-technology-and-patent-
policy&itemid=67&lang=en.  
21  This exception allows a company to initiate procedures for the marketing approval of a generic product before the expiry of the relevant patent.
22  see, for example, carlos correa (2011) ‘Test data protection: rights conferred under the TriPs agreement and some effects of TriPs-plus standards, in 
the law and theory of trade secrecy’, in rochelle c. Dreyfuss and Katherine J. strandburg (eds.) a handbook of contemporary research, edward elgar Publish-
ing, cheltenham.
23  see below.
24  article 31(k) authorizes export of unlimited quantities where a licence is granted on competition grounds.
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nent the waiver of article 31(f ) and (h). The amendment is, however, subject to the approval by two thirds of the WTo Mem-
bers.25 The 6 December 2005 agreement was criticized by a number of civil society groups and non-governmental actors—in 
particular, the international humanitarian aid organization Médecins sans Frontières (MsF), which expressed alarm that the 
decision to amend the TriPs agreement was based on a mechanism that had failed to prove that it could improve access 
to medicines.26 concerns about the effectiveness of this mechanism have also been raised by several developing countries 
recently at the council for TriPs.27
Finally, the Doha Declaration reaffirmed “the commitment of developed-country members to provide incentives to their enter-
prises and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to least-developed country [lDc] members pursuant to 
article 66.2” of the TriPs agreement.28 it also declared the need to  extend the transitional period granted to lDcs under article 
66.1 for the  implementation of sections 5 (patents) and 7 (test data) of Part ii of the TriPs agreement and for the enforcement 
of rights provided for under these sections until 1 January 2016, without prejudice to the right to seek further extensions.29
25 as of october 2011, only 36 Members and the eU had notified their approval to the amendment.
26 WTO Members Should Reject Bad Deal on Medicines, Joint statement by nGos on TriPs and Public health, 3 December 2005. available at: www.cptech.
org/ip/wto/p6/ngos12032005.html.
27 Kaitlin Mara (2010) TRIPS Council Discusses Efficacy Of ACTA, Public Health Amendment, 29 october. available at: http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/2010/10/29/trips-council-discusses-efficacy-of-acta-public-health-amendment/.
28 on the very limited compliance with the obligation established by article 66.1, see carlos correa (2007) Intellectual Property in LDCs: strategies for enhanc-
ing technology transfer and dissemination, study prepared for UncTaD. available at: www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intitemiD=4316&lang=1.
29 see: Decision on the Extension of the Transitional Period Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obliga-
tions with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, adopted by the TriPs council on 27 June 2002, iP/c/25, 1 July 2002. There are currently 48 lDcs on the Un list, 
32 of which to date have become WTo Members. a list of WTo Members that are lDcs is available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
org7_e.htm. 
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The Doha Declaration and the right to health
The Doha Declaration does not explicitly refer to the right to health. however, the recognition that the TriPs agreement ”can 
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTo Members’ right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all” is crucial for the realization of that right.
article 25 of the Universal Declaration of human rights (1948) recognises that a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of the individual and that person’s family, including medical care, is a right to which all human beings are inherently 
entitled to.30 article 12 of the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights (1966) requires that states take steps 
necessary for the full realization of this right, including those steps necessary for: the reduction of infant mortality and for the 
healthy development of the child; the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
and the creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention to all in the event of sickness.31
The presence of a right to health in several national constitutions has helped to focus attention on the problem of access to medi-
cines. in south africa, the right to health care services, including reproductive health care, is enshrined in section 27.1(a) of the 
constitution and can be read in conjunction with the obligation on the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights (section 27.2) and the right of every 
child to basic health care services (section 28.1). These human rights became the basis of a complaint related to access to patented 
pharmaceutical products that was brought before the south african constitutional court in July 2002. The applicants, the Treat-
ment action campaign (Tac), were concerned that the refusal of the south african government to make the arV nevirapine avail-
able in the public health sector and not setting out a timeframe for a national programme to prevent mother-to-child transmission 
(MTcT) of hiV breached these terms. Finding in favour of the applicants, the south african constitutional court held that sections 
27.1 and 27.2 of the constitution require the government to devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive 
and coordinated programme to realize progressively the rights of pregnant women and their newborn children to have access to 
health services to combat MTcT of hiV. The court also confirmed that the state is obliged to ensure that children are accorded the 
protection contemplated by section 28.1(c) of the constitution. The south african government was ordered to remove the restric-
tions that prevent nevirapine from being made available for the purpose of reducing the risk of MTcT of hiV without delay.32
similarly, the right to health is enshrined in article 196 of the 1988 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil (constitution 
of the Federal republic of Brazil) and quickly became the focus of attention for nGos acting on behalf of people living with 
hiV and seeking to articulate the universal right of access to arVs. The three principles of universality, equality and integrated 
health care define the Brazilian state’s promotion of health as a fundamental social right and, although the Brazilian constitu-
tion does not mention specifically access to medicines as part of the right to health, it is generally acknowledged that the right 
to access to medicines is derived from its implementing legislation.33 specifically, article 6(i)(d) of law 8.080/90, which estab-
30  article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of human rights of 1948.
31  article 12(2) of the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights of 1966.
32  constitutional court of south africa, Minister of Health & Others v. Treatment Action Campaign & Others, case ccT 8/02, 5 July 2002, 10 Bclr 1033 cc: 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/Zacc/2002/15.html.
33  see Monica rosina, steffen Guise, Daniel Wang and Thana christina de campos (2008) ‘access to Medicines: Pharmaceutical Patents and the right to 
health’, in lea shaver (ed.) Access to Knowledge in Brazil: New Research on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Development, information society Project, Yale law 
school, new haven, cT, p. 170.
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lished the founding principles of the Brazilian national health system, the Sistema Único de Saúde (sUs), provides that the sUs 
“must be responsible for promoting full medical assistance, which includes pharmaceutical assistance”.
in line with this obligation, in 1990 the Federal Government began free delivery of arVs, to people living with hiV in Brazil and, 
subsequently, this universal right to health, including access to medicines, has acted as a catalyst for the mobilization of com-
pulsory licensing provisions contained in articles 69 and 71 of industrial Property law 9.279/96 to secure price reductions for 
patented pharmaceutical products in Brazil. By 2001, this strategy had enabled the Brazilian Federal Government to negotiate 
substantial price reductions for arVs with several pharmaceutical manufacturers, including a 64.8 percent price reduction for 
indinavir, 59 percent for efavirenz, 40 percent for nelfinavir and 46 percent for lopinavir.34 The right to health has thus contributed 
to a greater emphasis on the importance of using in-built flexibilities in the TriPs agreement to ensure access to medicines.
it is sometimes argued that iPrs also have a human rights dimension because intellectual property is essentially the same as 
‘property’ in tangible assets and must therefore be secured by the same legal guarantees. it is also pointed out that article 27 
of the Universal Declaration of human rights states that everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material in-
terests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author. article 15 of the international 
covenant on economic social and cultural rights contains a similarly worded provision. 
however, the Un committee on economic, social and cultural rights drew the distinction in its influential General com-
ment 17 (2005) between iPrs and human rights, including the right to health, which are fundamental, inalienable and 
universal entitlements belonging to individuals and, in certain circumstances, groups of individuals and communities.35 
General comment 17 noted that human rights are fundamental because they are inherent in the human person as such, 
whereas iPrs are first and foremost means by which states seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity, 
encourage the dissemination of creative and innovative productions, as well as the development of cultural identities, 
and preserve the integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions for the benefit of society as a whole. Furthermore, 
in contrast with human rights, iPrs are generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to 
someone else. While under most intellectual property systems, iPrs, with the exception of moral rights, may be allocated, 
limited in time and scope, traded, amended and even forfeited, human rights are timeless expressions of fundamental 
entitlements of the human person.
in addition, while iPrs can provide, in certain contexts, incentives to stimulate innovation, they can conflict with, and have 
adverse implications for, the international human right to health. The 2001 report of the United nations high commissioner on 
human rights (Unhchr) on the impact of the TriPs agreement acknowledged this fact, noting that iPrs could have adverse 
implications on the right to health and stressing the need to balance the protection of both public and private interests.36
34  Duncan Matthews (2011) Intellectual Property, Human Rights and Development, edward elgar Publishing, cheltenham, p. 132
35  United nations economic and social committee (2005) General Comment No. 17 on the right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author (article 15(1)(c) of the Covenant), committee on economic, 
social and cultural rights, 35th session, 7–25 november, e/c.12/2005/Gc/17.
36  United nations commission on human rights (2001) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights on human Rights: report of the High Commissioner, 27 June, e/cn.4/sub.2/2001/13/, p. 5.
THe DoHA DecLARATIon AnD THe RIGHT To HeALTH
14 T h e D o h a D e c l a r aT i o n T e n Ye a r s o n
The adoption of the Doha Declaration triggered a number of actions at the international level aimed at addressing the tension 
between iPrs and the right to health. For instance, the 59th World health assembly (2006) expressed concerns about the impli-
cations that iPrs could have on prices for pharmaceutical products and on access to medicines.37 in 2008, the 61st World health 
assembly adopted the World health organization (Who) Global strategy and Plan of action on Public health, innovation and 
intellectual Property, which called for more efforts to implement states’ obligations arising under applicable international hu-
man rights instruments with provisions relevant to health.38 in particular, the Who global strategy acknowledged article 7 of 
the TriPs agreement, and required actions to be taken to: promote transfer of technology and the production of health prod-
ucts in developing countries; support improved collaboration and coordination of technology transfer for health products, 
bearing in mind different levels of development; and develop possible new mechanisms to promote transfer of, and access to, 
key health-related technologies.
significantly, the Who Global strategy alluded in several sections to the flexibilities recognized by the Doha Declaration. Thus, 
Paragraph 38 stated: 
[i]nternational agreements that may have an impact on access to health products in developing countries need to be 
regularly monitored with respect to their development and application. any flexibilities in such agreements, includ-
ing those contained in the TriPs agreement and recognized by the Doha Declaration on the TriPs agreement and 
Public health that would permit improved access need to be considered for action by national authorities in the light 
of the circumstances in their countries.
The special rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of Physical and Mental 
health has stressed the relevance of various aspects of the Doha Declaration for the realization of the right to health, particu-
larly as it “recognized concerns over the effect of iP on medicine prices and reaffirmed the right of member states to use TriPs 
flexibilities to achieve public health needs and promote access to medicines for all”.39 The special rapporteur also noted that 
several countries have not taken advantage of the policy space guaranteed by the Doha Declaration and are yet to revise their 
laws to incorporate TriPs flexibilities, and that the early implementation of intellectual property legislation in lDcs, coupled 
with the unwillingness or inability of countries to insert TriPs flexibilities into national legislation, leaves the sustainability of 
treatment scale-up in some jeopardy.40 
The limited progress made in attaining Goal 6 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),41 makes it imperative to use 
such flexibilities to the fullest extent possible. in 2003, the Who published The Public Health Approach to Antiretroviral Therapy: 
Overlapping Constraints, in which it laid out a strategic rationale for the rapid scale-up of antiretroviral therapy (arT) in low and 
37 World health assembly resolution on Public health, innovation and essential health research and intellectual Property rights, 27 May 2006.
38 Who Global strategy and Plan of action on Public health, innovation and intellectual Property, 24 May 2008.
39 Promotion And Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Including The Right To Development, report of the special 
rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, a/hrc/11/12, 31 March 2009, p. 11.
40 ibid.
41 Goal 6: combating hiV/aiDs, Malaria and other Diseases, with the following targets: (1) halt and begin to reverse, by 2015, the spread of hiV/aiDs; (2) 
achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for hiV/aiDs for all those who need it; (3) halt and begin to reverse, by 2015, the incidence of malaria and 
other major diseases.
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middle-income countries.42 Preliminary data indicate that, by the end of 2010, more than 6 million adults and children were 
receiving arT, compared with only 30,000 in 2003.43 This achievement is impressive, but much work remains. in view of the 
expanded use of arVs mentioned above, 10 million people who are eligible do not have access to arT.44 Dedicated financing 
for arT rose from Us$1.6 billion in 2001 to Us$15.9 billion in 2009, with substantial increases in funding through the Global 
Fund to Fight aiDs, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the Us President’s emergency Plan for aiDs relief (PePFar) and other bilateral 
programmes and charitable contributions.
Yet there is a very real risk that the global economic downturn may have a negative impact on the sustainability of these types 
of programmes, with the world facing a shortfall in financing aiDs in the context of the current global economic constraints.45 
another important reason for retaining policy space is that the new 2010 Who hiV treatment guidelines for adults and adoles-
cents have recommended earlier treatment, thereby increasing the number of people estimated to need arT to nearly 15 mil-
lion.46 Furthermore, it is becoming clear that the cost of treatment for hepatitis c and ncDs associated with hiV, such as certain 
types of cancers, is also extremely high.
Patented medicines almost always cost much more than the equivalent, unpatented, ‘generic’ versions.47 The need to shift to 
newer therapies involving patented products (namely to overcome resistance to current treatments) will increase dramatically 
the need for funding. For instance, raltegravir, a new arV, is sold in Brazil for $5,870 per patient per year (ppy) and for $675 ppy 
in lDcs (which are not bound to recognize patent protection until 2016). even the price for lDcs is already four times that of 
the recommended triple first-generation combination (TDF/3Tc/eFV).48 a report on PePFar’s activities in Vietnam noted that 
“[e]xpectations that the cost of lopinavir/ritonavir would fall by 50% in 2009 due to the introduction of generic versions were 
dashed when it was discovered that abbott has patents pending in Vietnam and that abbott intended to use the patents to 
prevent the procurement of generic alternatives.”49 Figure 1 comparatively shows prices of different arVs and their dramatic 
increase for new treatments.
42 ian Grubb, Jos Perriëns and Bernhard schwartländer (2003) The Public Health Approach to Antiretroviral Threapy: Overlapping Constraints, Who, Geneva. 
available at: http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/prev_care/en/Publichealthapproach_e.pdf.
43 Who (2010) Antiretroviral Therapy for HIV Infection in Adults and Adolecents: Recommendations for a public health approach. 2010 revision. available at: 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2010/9789241599764_eng.pdf.
44 Gottfried hirnshall and Bernhard schwartländer (2011) ‘Treatment 2.0: catalysing the next phase of scale-up’, The Lancet, 25 February.
45 ibid. see also Jennifer Kates, adam Wexler, eric lief, carlos avila, Benjamin Gobet (2011) Financing the Response to AIDS in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: 
International Assistance from the G8, European Commission and other donor governments in 2010. available at: http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/7347-07.pdf.
46 The situation is even more urgent among children living with hiV. see UnaiDs, UnDP, Who (2011) Using TRIPS flexibilities to improve access to HIV treatment, 
Policy Brief. available at:  http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/publications/hiv-aids/using-trips-flexibilities-to-improve-access-to-hiv-treatment.en. 
47 a recent report notes that, in general, “[o]riginator brand medicines generally cost substantially more than their generic equivalents. Patients purchas-
ing medicines in the private sector in developing countries pay, on average, 2.6 times more for originator brands than for their lowest-priced generic equiva-
lent”, United nations, The Global Partnership for Development (2011) Time to Deliver, MDG Gap Task Force Report 2011, Un, new York, p. 54.
48 see MsF (2011) Untangling the Web of antiretroviral price reductions, Press release. available at: http://msf-utw.tumblr.com/post/7755591372/14th-
edition-of-untangling-the-web-launches-at. 
49 PePFar (2010) Vietnam COP Report FY 2010. available at: http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/145740.pdf.
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Figure 1: Evolution of prices for selected antiretrovirals
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however, while the prices of new medicines require additional resources from governments and other donors, as a result of 
the global financial crisis there are indications already that donor funding is being frozen or even reduced.50 TThe TriPs agree-
ment, in addition, has limited the extent to which developing countries can produce, import and export cheaper generic ver-
sions of medicines. Because article 27.1 of the TriPs agreement prohibits discrimination relating to the field of technology, the 
previously available possibility of deciding whether or not to grant patent protection for pharmaceutical products has been 
eliminated. all WTo Members were required, at the end of the appropriate transitional periods, to provide patent protection 
for pharmaceutical products. 
in this context, the use of TriPs flexibilities, notably compulsory licences, will be increasingly necessary in many countries to 
drive prices of needed medicines down. as noted by the special rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard to Physical and Mental health, the TriPs agreement and FTas have had an adverse impact on prices 
and availability of medicines, making it difficult for countries to comply with their obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the 
right to health. The report, therefore, recommends that developing countries and lDcs review their laws and policies and con-
sider whether they have made full use of flexibilities contained in the TriPs agreement or included TriPs-plus measures and, if 
necessary, consider amending their laws and policies to make full use of the flexibilities available to them.51 in light of the special 
rapporteur’s report, the link between the right to health and the use of flexibilities contained in the TriPs agreement, and the 
review of national implementing legislation, look set to remain central to attempts to promote access to medicines in developing 
and least-developed countries in the future.52
50 see, for example, Jennifer Kates, Kim Boortz, eric lief, carlos avila and Benjamin Gobet (2010) Financing the Response to AIDS in Low-and Middle-Income 
Countries: International Assistance from the G8, European Commission and Other Donor Governments in 2009, The henry J. Kaiser Foundation/UnaiDs. available 
at: http://kff.org/hivaids/upload/7347-06.pdf.
51 see recommendations contained in UnaiDs, UnDP, Who Policy brief, op. cit.
52 United nations (2009) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental 
Health (Anand Grover), United nations General assembly, 11th session, 31 March 2009, agenda item 3, a/hrc/11/12, United nations, new York.
Source: MsF (2011) Untangling the web, 14th edition 
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in sum, adherence to the Doha Declaration by ensuring that the TriPs flexibilities are effectively applied, may promote the real-
ization of the right to health by enhancing access to affordable medicines and other pharmaceutical products. While the TriPs 
agreement has been adopted and is enforced in the context of a trade organization, governments should bear in mind that its 
implementation may have far-reaching implications in the area of public health. Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration indicates, 
in fact, that governments not only may but also have the duty to use the TriPs flexibilities necessary to protect public health. 
Therefore, actions should be taken to provide for such flexibilities in domestic legislation and preserve the room to apply them 
in trade and other bilateral, regional or international agreements.
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Promoting the use of flexibilities 
confirmed by the Doha Declaration 
The main objective of the Doha Declaration was to confirm the right of any WTo Member, particularly developing countries, to 
use the TriPs flexibilities as described above, to offset the adverse effects of higher prices resulting from the patenting of phar-
maceutical products and to facilitate access to them. To what extent has it actually contributed to achieving this objective?
The Doha Declaration has had a number of significant repercussions. it helped to attract public attention to a problem that not 
only has socio-economic but ethical implications: while medicines may be available, people in need may be deprived of treatment 
as a result of the enforcement of iPrs. international and non-governmental organizations have relied heavily on the Doha Declara-
tion in analyses and advocacy regarding access to medicines. The Declaration has also been invoked as a basis for policy action at 
both national and regional level in the field of access to medicines. For instance, the european Parliament, in its resolution on the 
TriPs agreement and access to medicines (12 July 2007), cited the Doha Declaration and asked the european council:
to support the developing countries which use the so-called flexibilities built into the TriPs agreement and recog-
nized by the Doha Declaration in order to be able to provide essential medicines at affordable prices under their 
domestic public health programmes (para. 8).53
The resolution further called on the european council:
to meet its commitments to the Doha Declaration and to restrict the commission’s mandate so as to prevent it from nego-
tiating pharmaceutical-related TriPs-plus provisions affecting public health and access to medicines, such as data exclusiv-
ity, patent extensions and limitation of grounds of compulsory licences, within the framework of the ePa negotiations with 
the acP countries and other future bilateral and regional agreements with developing countries (para. 11).54
The Doha Declaration was also expressly referenced in the Us Trade Promotion authority prior to its lapse in 2007.55 From a 
legal point of view, and although the Doha Declaration is not formally an authoritative interpretation of the TriPs agreement 
(in terms of article iX.2 of the Marrakesh agreement establishing the WTo),56 in affirming that the TriPs agreement “can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTo Members’ right to protect public health”, the Declara-
tion gives guidance to panels and the appellate Body for the interpretation of the agreement’s provisions in cases involving 
public health issues.57 Therefore, panels and the appellate Body should opt for interpretations on the meaning of particular 
53  see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubref=-//eP//TeXT+Ta+P6-Ta-2007-0353+0+Doc+XMl+V0//en. The resolution also “[e]ncour-
ages the developing countries to use all means available to them under the TriPs agreement, such as compulsory licences and the mechanism provided by 
article 30 thereof” (para. 9).
54  ibid. 
55  19 U.s.c.a. §3802(b)(4)(c). see ciel (2007) Putting Health on the Fast Track. available at: http://www.ciel.org/Publications/lee_DohaUsTr_25July07.pdf.
56  a ‘declaration’ has no specific legal status in the framework of WTo law.
57  The european commission, for instance, stated that “in the case of disputes (e.g. in the context of WTo dispute settlement procedures) Members can 
avail themselves of the comfort provided by this Declaration. Panelists are likely to take account of the provisions of the TriPs agreement themselves as well 
as of this complementary Declaration, which, although it was not meant to affect Members’ rights and obligations, expresses the Members’ views and inten-
tions. hence, the Declaration is part of the context of the TriPs agreement, which, according to the rules of treaty interpretation, has to be taken into account 
when interpreting the agreement” (european commission (2001). WTO Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.  european commis-
sion, Brussels, 19 november 2001, p. 2).
PRoMoTInG THe use of fLexIBILITIes confIRMeD BY THe DoHA DecLARATIon 
19a n D i Ts  i M Pac T o n acc e s s To M e D i c i n e s a n D T h e r i G h T To h e a lT h
provisions that are “supportive of WTo Members’ right to protect public health in disputes”. significantly, no complaint against 
a WTo Member has been filed under the Dispute settlement Understanding on matters relating to iPrs and public health 
since the adoption of the Declaration, despite arguments about inadequate iPrs protection in some countries. For instance, 
countries issuing compulsory licences aimed at enhancing access to arVs and related treatment continue to be placed on the 
United states special 301 Watch list.58 however, no complaint has been submitted under WTo rules against those countries. it 
is not possible to determine whether this is a concrete effect of the Declaration, but potential complainants would have had 
the burden of overcoming public health-related interpretations submitted by complained Members. 
The implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration has been mentioned in a WTo dispute, not as a defensive argument, 
but to establish non-compliance with WTo obligations by the eU. india initiated dispute settlement consultations on 11 May 2010 
with the eU in relation to the ec custom regulation 1383/2003 as a result of the repeated detention of generic medicines pro-
duced in india while in transit through eU territory. in its complaint, india argued that detentions were inconsistent with the eU’s 
obligations under article 31 of the TriPs agreement read together with the provisions of the WTo Decision of 30 august 2003.59
The impact of the Doha Declaration as an interpretative tool of the obligations under the TriPs agreement can also be ob-
served in some court decisions at the national level. For instance, in a case where novartis argued that article 39.3 required 
data exclusivity in relation to its product Gleevec® in argentina, the appeal court argued, inter alia, that the Doha Declaration 
allowed for a “flexible interpretation” of that provision and confirmed that the TriPs-consistency of the argentine regime was 
consistent with TriPs, which does not grant exclusive rights in relation to test data.60
Despite these multiple repercussions of the Doha Declaration, an evaluation after five years of the adoption of the Declaration 
noted that developed countries had taken little or no action towards their obligations and were in some cases actually under-
mining the Declaration.61 Ten years after its adoption, this situation has not improved. The Doha Declaration has promoted only 
to a limited extent the incorporation of the TriPs flexibilities in national laws and regulations and their effective use.62
a study on the implementation of said flexibilities has shown that 29 developing countries, including many low-income 
countries,63 provide for national or regional exhaustion of rights. article 6 of the TriPs agreement, as noted, allows instead 
58  see United nations (2009) Promotion And Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, Including The Right To Devel-
opment, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and
Mental Health, a/hrc/11/12, 31 March 2009, United nations, new York, p. 20.
59  on 28 July 2011, the Government of india announced an “Understanding” with the european Union to settle the dispute. see Brook K. Baker (2011) Set-
tlement of India/EU WTO Dispute re Seizures of In-Transit Medicines: Why the Proposed EU Border Regulation Isn’t Good Enough. available at: http://www.google.fr/
search?client=safari&rls=en&q=india+eu+border+measures+wto+case&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&redir_esc=&ei=Kb6UTuKiDiTj4QTcwlscca.
60  novartis Pharma aG c/Monteverde sa s/varios propiedad industrial e intelectual, sala iii, camara nacional de apelaciones en lo civil y comercial Fed-
eral, 1 February, 2011.
61  oxfam (2006) Patents vs. Patients: Five Years After the Doha Declaration, oxfam, oxford. available at: www.oxfam.org/en/policy/bp95_
patentsvspatients_061114. 
62  see, for example, United nations Development Programme (2008) Access to ART and Other Essential Medicines in Sub-Saharan Africa: Intellectual Property 
and Relevant Legislation; World Intellectual Property Organization (2010) Patent Related Flexibilities in the Multilateral Legal Framework and their Legislative Imple-
mentation at the National and Regional Levels, cDiP/5/4, WiPo, Geneva. available at: http://www.wipo.int./meetings/en/details.jsp?meeting_id=19686.  
63  china, Philippines, sri lanka, Thailand, Barbados, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Botswana, Morocco, nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
cameroon, central african republic, chad, congo, cote d’ivoire, equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, niger, senegal and Togo, 
based on carloyn Deere (2010) ‘The implementation game: the TriPs agreement and the global politics of intellectual property reform in developing coun-
tries’, presentation at The TriPs@10 conference, 16–18 november 2010, at columbia University’s Faculty house. available at http://www.earth.columbia.edu/
tripsat10/?id=related_materials. see also World intellectual Property organization (2010) Patent-related flexibilities in the multilateral legal framework and their leg-
islative implementation at the national and regional levels, cDiP/5/4, WiPo, Geneva. available at: http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/details. jsp?meeting_id=19686.  
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for an international exhaustion, which may be critical for ensuring access to low-price medicines available in foreign mar-
kets. similarly, only a relatively small number of developing countries specifically provide for the ‘Bolar exception’.64 in at least 
45 developing countries65 patents on the second indication of pharmaceutical products are allowed, although this is not 
required by the TriPs agreement and is based on a legal fiction on novelty and industrial applicability. although article 39.3 
of the TriPs agreement does not require the grant of exclusive rights in respect of test data, at least 41 developing countries 
do grant such rights.66
Most national laws incorporated provisions on different modalities of compulsory licences and government use for non-com-
mercial purposes before the adoption of the TriPs agreement. although such provisions have been retained or modified to 
meet the agreement’s standards on the matter, only few developing countries67 have granted such licences to address public 
health needs, particularly to ensure the supply of low-cost treatments for hiV in the last 10 years .68 
Therefore, the Doha Declaration did not seem to have triggered a widespread incorporation and use of TriPs flexibilities to 
increase access to medicines. This is possibly the result of many factors.69
First, many countries prematurely changed their iPrs regimes, including patent laws, before the end of the transitional pe-
riod for the general application of the TriPs agreement in developing countries (1 January 2000) and before recognizing the 
full impact of iPrs on access to medicines. Given the sensitivity of iPrs issues, governments have been reluctant to review 
the adopted legislation to incorporate flexibilities not present in the existing legislation. one exception has been india, as 
noted above. The Philippines also changed its legislation through the Universally accessible Quality and cheaper Medicines 
act of 2008 (republic act 9502) to introduce a number of TriPs flexibilities (patentability requirements similar to those of 
section 3(d) of the indian Patents act, Bolar exception, international exhaustion of iPrs, amendment to the conditions for 
the use of a patented invention by the government without agreement of the patent owner).70 china amended its patent 
law in 2010. The amendment introduced the standard of absolute novelty (article 22),71 the ‘Bolar exception’ (article 69) and 
modified provisions on compulsory licences.  article 50 of the revised patent law states that for the purpose of public health 
the Patent administration Department under the state council may grant a compulsory licence to make a patented phar-
maceutical product and to export it to the relevant country or region that satisfies the provisions of relevant international 
64  Jordan, Thailand, china, india, Malaysia, costa rica, Dominican republic, Paraguay, argentina, Brazil, nigeria, egypt, Kenya, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe 
(Deere, op. cit).
65  Deere, op. cit. only in 12 developing countries are second-indication patents are specifically excluded.
66  ibid. 
67  Zimbabwe, Malaysia, Zambia, Ghana, indonesia, Thailand, Brazil and ecuador.
68  see below additional information on some of these cases.
69  see, for example, sisule F. Musungu, susan Villanueva and roxana Blasetti (2004) Utilizing TRIPS Flexibilities for Public Health Protection through South-
South Regional Frameworks, south centre, Geneva, p. 30.
70  see, for example, ronil emmavi J. remoquillo (2009) ‘implications of the Patentability requirements and other Policy considerations to the Pharmaceutical 
industry - The Japanese and Philippine experience’,  Intellectual Property Philippines. available at: http://www.training-jpo.go.jp/en/uploads/text_vtr/ws_pdf/ws-
145.pdf.
71  The principle of ‘absolute novelty’ means that the novelty of an invention is judged against all information available at the priority date of the invention, 
irrespective of where the information was released or the form in which it was released. This means that all material made available to the public anywhere 
in the world forms part of the state of the art and can be distinguished from relative novelty, whereby a publication available in any country will destroy 
novelty, but use of the invention outside the country in which protection is sought does not.
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treaties entered into by china. other developing countries have moved, however, in the opposite direction. For instance, the 
broadly defined concept of ‘counterfeit’ contained in the Kenyan ‘anti-counterfeit Bill 2008’ may be used to block the com-
mercialization of legitimate generic medicines.72 
second, and most importantly, a significant number of developing countries have entered into FTas and other bilateral agree-
ments that incorporate, in exchange for trade concessions, measures – commonly referred to as ‘TriPs-plus’ provisions – that 
exceed the obligations under the TriPs agreement and limit the capacity of developing countries to effectively issue com-
pulsory licences, allow parallel importation or use other TriPs flexibilities.73 TriPs-plus obligations that may affect access to 
medicines include:74
extension of patent terms to compensate for delays in the examination of a patent application or in obtaining 	
marketing approval for a drug; 
patent linkage requirements that prevent the marketing approval of generic versions of a medicine when patents 	
relating to it exist (required in Us FTas);
requirements to grant patents for second indications of known pharmaceuticals; 	
periods of exclusivity for test data; and	
enhanced enforcement provisions—for instance, in relation to border measures (allowing customs authorities to 	
seize goods on suspicion of infringement of a patent in cases of importation, exportation or transit).
Third, some developing countries (not involved in FTas) do not seem to have received appropriate technical assistance and 
capacity-building to fully understand and incorporate the TriPs flexibilities.75 often, governments have been subject to de-
mands and pressures from developed countries and industry lobbies to apply levels of iPrs protection beyond what is re-
quired by the TriPs agreement (e.g. data exclusivity, linkage between drug registration and patent protection).76 in particular, 
the use of compulsory licensing provisions has sometimes been problematic not only because governments are subject to 
such pressures, but the procedural requirements are complex and burdensome to apply, particularly for developing and least-
developed countries that lack the necessary technical and legal expertise and administrative capacity.
Fourth, the system established by the WTo Decision of 30 august 2003 is subject to a number of conditions and limitations (for 
instance, export of specified quantities of a medicine to a particular country). The Decision does not provide sufficient incen-
72  “counterfeiting” is a term with a very specific meaning in intellectual property law. it is a term defined in article 51, footnote 14 of the TriPs agreement 
and describes the theft of brand owners’ intellectual property, namely a trademark violation. see also charles clift (2010), ”counterfeit Medicines: health and 
harm”, The World Today, Volume 66, number 12: http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/twt/archive/view/-/id/2102/.
73  sisule F. Musungu, susan Villanueva and roxana Blasetti (2004) ”Utilizing TriPs Flexibilities for Public health Protection through south-south regional 
Frameworks,“Geneva: south centre, page 30.
74  see, for example, Bryan Mercurio (2006) “TriPs-Plus Provisions in FTas: recent Trends”, in lorand Bartels, and Federico ortino (eds.) i, oxford University 
Press, 215-237, page 224.
75  see Duncan Matthews (2005) ‘TriPs Flexibilities and access to Medicines in Developing countries: The Problem with Technical assistance and Free Trade 
agreements’, European Intellectual Property Review, 28, 11: 420–427, p. 425.
76  el said, M. and amy Kapczynski (2011) ‘access to medicines: The role of intellectual property law and policy’, Paper prepared for the Third Meeting of the 
Technical advisory Group, Global commission on hiV and the law, UnDP, new York, Usa.
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tives for generic companies to supply low-cost medicines, inter alia, because such companies are bound to obtain a compulso-
ry licence in the exporting (and, in some cases, also the importing) country, cannot exploit economies of scale and, at any time, 
the patent owner may reduce the prices of (or even donate) the required medicines and thereby undermine the efforts made to 
supply a generic version of the products. a major hurdle is also the need for potential suppliers to undertake prior negotiations 
with patent owners. so far, only a few countries have enacted legislation to implement the WTo Decision as potential export-
ers (namely canada, china, norway, india, the netherlands, iceland and the eU through regulation (ec) no. 816/2006), and the 
system has only been used in one case (supply of an arV from canada to rwanda). This case has demonstrated the hurdles that 
the Decision creates for potential exporters and importers, and the extent to which generic firms may be reluctant to take the 
risk and make the investment necessary to provide a particular medicine under the system.77 
in some limited cases, the Doha Declaration may have dissuaded countries from introducing TriPs-plus demands. in the case 
of the Us–Jordan FTa, as noted above, limitations on the grounds for granting compulsory licences have been included. This 
agreement was negotiated before the Doha Declaration; the absence of such limitations in other Us FTas with developing 
countries may suggest that the clear confirmation in Paragraph 5(b) of the Declaration of the freedom to determine such 
grounds has discouraged Us demands in that respect. similarly, in line with the clear confirmation of the principle of the right 
to define the scope of the exhaustion of rights in Paragraph 5(d) of the Declaration, most FTas do not restrict parallel trade (the 
Us–Morocco FTa is an exception).
The Bipartisan agreement on Trade Policy reached in May 200778 also reflected, to some extent, the concerns that led to the 
adoption of the Doha Declaration. on the basis of this agreement, this new Trade Policy mitigated some public-health TriPs-
plus provisions (relating to data exclusivity, patent term extensions and patent-registration linkage) demanded by the Us gov-
ernment in FTas with Peru, colombia, Panama and south Korea. according to some commentators, however, the Us govern-
ment seems to have backtracked from the new Trade Policy in the proposals for a Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, which, 
despite claims to the contrary in the office of the UsTr White Paper on trade goals to enhance access to medicines,79 have 
raised concerns among civil society groups that they contain many new TriPs-plus terms that are collectively more onerous 
than have ever previously been presented.80
The Doha Declaration may have also played a role in limiting eU demands for TriPs-plus protection in the european Partner-
ship agreement (ePa) signed with cariForUM countries. in accordance with article 139:2, “[n]othing in this agreement shall 
be construed as to impair the capacity of the Parties and the signatory cariForUM states to promote access to medicines.” 
however, although this ePa does not contain substantive standards directly affecting the level of iPrs protection for pharma-
ceuticals, it does contain TriPs-plus provisions on enforcement that may affect the commercialization of generic medicines.81
77  see richard elliott (2008) ‘Delivering on the Pledge: Global access to Medicines, WTo rules, and reforming canada’s law on compulsory licensing for 
export’, McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law & Policy, Volume 3, issue 1.
78  available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset_upload_file127_11319.pdf.
79  UsTr (2011) Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to Medicines. available at: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2011/september/trade-enhancing-access-medicines.
80  sean Flynn (2011) Statement on USTR Release of White Paper on ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Goals to Enhance Access to Medicines’, 12 september 2011. 
available at: http://infojustice.org/archives/5453.
81  For instance, article 163 of the cariForUM ePa is TriPs-plus in requiring signatories to adopt procedures to enable a right holder, who has valid 
grounds for suspecting that the importation, exportation, re-exportation, entry or exit of the customs territory, placement under a suspensive procedure or 
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interestingly, while iPrs chapters in FTas contain, as a result of developed countries’ demands, TriPs-plus provisions that may 
affect access to medicines, specific references to the Doha Declaration may be found in many such chapters.82 such references 
in some cases are of general nature, such as recognizing the “principles”83 or the “importance”84 of the Doha Declaration. These 
provisions may have a role in interpreting other provisions of the agreements when they are ambiguous, but would not help to 
mitigate clearly worded TriPs-plus obligations. in the case of the eU–colombia–Peru FTa, a reference to the importance of the 
Doha Declaration is complemented by a provision stating that ”in interpreting and implementing the rights and obligations 
under this Title, the Parties shall ensure consistency with this Declaration” (article 197:2). This rule may be useful to interpret 
some exceptions in the agreement, such as the one relating to data exclusivity (article 231.4). 85 
in sum, the Doha Declaration has had a clear impact on the international discourse relating to iPrs and access to medicines and 
some impact on the implementation of national laws and the use of TriPs flexibilities, but has not been sufficient to prevent 
TriPs-plus demands, concessions and commitments in FTas and other bilateral agreements that may negatively affect access 
to medicines. 
placement under a customs-free zone or a customs-free warehouse of goods infringing an iPr may take place, to lodge an application in writing with compe-
tent authorities, administrative or judicial, the suspension by the customs authorities of the release into free circulation or the retention of such goods. This 
provision in the cariForUM ePa exceeds the enforcement obligations of article 51 of the TriPs agreement, which requires only that WTo Members adopt 
procedures to enable a right holder, who has valid grounds for suspecting that the importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated copyright goods (i.e. not 
suspected patent-infringing goods) may take place, to lodge an application in writing with competent authorities, administrative or judicial, for the suspen-
sion by the customs authorities of the release into free circulation of such goods. Under article 51 of TriPs, however, WTo Members retain the flexibility to 
determine for themselves whether these enforcement measures apply to goods destined for exportation from their territories.
82  The Preamble of the anti-counterfeiting Trade agreement (acTa), which somehow epitomizes the TriPs-plus paradigm, also contains a preambular 
reference to the Doha Declaration. 
83  see Us–chile FTa, preamble.
84  see eU–cariForUM ePa, article 147(b).
85  For a general analysis, see henning Grosse ruse-Khan (2011) ‘The international law relation between TriPs and subsequent TriPs-Plus Free 
Trade agreements: Towards safeguarding TriPs Flexibilities?’, Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, no. 2, p. 1. available at ssrn: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1849204. This article notes that, in some cases, language similar or identical to parts of the Doha Declaration is included in some FTas (e.g. Us–
colombia TPa, article 16.13.2).
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using TRIPs flexibilities to attain the 
right to health: successes and challenges
a number of experiences in developing countries show how the use of TriPs flexibilities may be instrumental in pursuing 
public health objectives. after failed attempts to negotiate a price reduction for the arV drug Kaletra® with abbott, in June 
2005 Brazil’s Minister of health signed a decree declaring Kaletra® to be in the public interest, paving the way for compulsory 
licence and the manufacture of a generic version of Kaletra® to be produced by the Farmanguinhos laboratory of the oswaldo 
cruz Foundation. however, at the same time that it declared Kaletra® to be in the public interest, the Brazilian government gave 
abbott a timeframe in which to offer a lower price for the drug and so avert the compulsory licence from being issued. subse-
quently, in october 2005, an agreement was reached between the Brazilian Federal Government and abbott to supply the drug 
at a lower price than had previously been available. in return for a lower price, the Brazilian Federal Government undertook to 
increase the number of patients prescribed Kaletra®, and to refrain from issuing a compulsory licence or engage in other tech-
nology transfer or foreign direct investment activities to manufacture Kaletra® locally, and fixing the stipulated price until the 
end of 2011, when the patent for Kaletra® would be close to expiry.
later, in May 2007, the Brazilian government took the decision to grant a compulsory licence on a patent relating to efavirenz, 
an arV of growing importance in the successful national programme to treat hiV. a remuneration of 1.5 percent of the price of 
the generic medicine was offered to the originator. The compulsory licence allowed the government to obtain the drug at 28 
percent of the price of the original product.86 
in india, the use of TriPs flexibilities has focused on article 27.1 of the TriPs agreement. When india became a founding Mem-
ber of the WTo, it was obliged to introduce a series of amendments to the Patents act of 1970 that were designed to ensure 
compatibility with obligations set out in the TriPs agreement. These amendments included measures designed to meet the 
obligation contained in article 27.1 of the TriPs agreement to extend patent protection to all fields of technology, including 
food, pharmaceutical and chemical products. in drafting legislative amendments to comply with its obligations under the TriPs 
agreement, india was also keen to address concerns about the adverse impact of compliance, particularly the likely implica-
tions of the TriPs agreement for the human right to life as enshrined in the indian constitution.87
To ensure that the constitutional right to life is respected, section 3(d) of the indian Patents (Third amendment) act of 2005 
set out that the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance is not to be considered an invention but that this could 
be regarded as such if it enhances the efficiency of a known invention. an explanation to that section clarified that salts, 
polymers and other new versions are to be treated as the same substance and not as new, patentable forms unless they dif-
fer in their properties significantly with regard to efficacy. although raising concerns for patentees that section 3(d) excludes 
86  amy s. nunn et al. (2007) ‘evolution of antiretroviral drug costs in Brazil in the context of free and universal access to aiDs treatment’, PLoS Med 4(11). 
available at: http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0040305&ct=1.
87  “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”
article 21 of the constitution of india of 1950.
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some applications that, on the usual criteria of patentability, would qualify as inventions,88 the provision has been described 
as an essential tool for keeping open the door for generic manufacture of medicines.89
as a result of section 3(d), a patent claim relating to a pharmaceutical product may relate to an active ingredient as such inde-
pendently of or jointly with formulations, salts, prodrugs, isomers and so on, or cover any of these subject matters separately, 
but subject to a higher standard of inventive activity.90 This provided india with considerable flexibility to determine what con-
stitutes an invention for the purposes of granting a patent91  and allows it to draw a distinction between genuinely patentable 
inventions and the practice of ‘evergreening’ spurious inventions.92
Furthermore, the indian Patents act of 2005 retained pre-grant opposition, which allows third parties to oppose patent applica-
tions prior to grant.93 since “any person” may have legal standing to bring pre-grant oppositions proceedings, generic produc-
ers and patient groups have been able to initiate numerous successful pre-grant oppositions under section 3(d) of the act.94 
in addition, the 2005 amendment introduced post-grant opposition, thereby offering the possibility of re-examining a patent 
application afresh.
The utilization of compulsory licences in Thailand also provides a telling example of the use of TriPs flexibilities. The Thai Pat-
ent act 1999 contains provisions for compulsory licensing in section 51, which provides that, to carry out any service for public 
consumption, any government ministry, bureau or department may exercise the rights in any patent without the requirement 
of prior negotiation with the patentee.95 iits objective relates specifically to non-commercial purposes and public interests – for 
example, the public health service. in 2006 the Thai government issued compulsory licences for a number of medicines used to 
treat hiV, cancer and heart disease.96
88  Thus, novartis has challenged a decision that prevented it from patenting imatinib messylate. it argued that section 3(d) of the Patents act is incon-
sistent with the TriPs agreement and that the definition of ‘efficacy’ should be broad enough to include increases in bioavailability and not an enhanced 
“therapeutic effect in healing a disease”, as defined by the Madras high court that rejected its patent application. see, for example, lawyers collective (2011) 
Novartis case: background and update – Supreme Court of India to recommence hearing. available at: http://www.lawyerscollective.org/news/126-novartis-case-
background-and-update-supreme-court-of-india-to-recommence-hearing.html. 
89  MsF (2009) HIV/AIDS Treatment in Developing Countries: The battle for long-term survival has just begun, campaign for access to essential Medicines, p. 5.
90  carlos correa (2000) Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, south centre, Geneva, p. 25.
91  This policy space, however, has not always been used, and patents of questionable inventive step have been granted. see sudip chaudhuri, chan Park 
and K.M. Gopakumar (2010) Five Years into the Product Patent Regime: India’s Response. new York: UnDP, new York. available at: http://apps.who.int/medicine-
docs/documents/s17761en/s17761en.pdf.
92  ‘evergreening’ is the term used to describe the process whereby pharmaceutical companies seek to reformulate, recombine and repackage the active 
ingredients and change the methods of administration, such as the dosages and the administration routes in order to obtain a new patent for pharmaceuti-
cal products soon to reach or which have reached patent expiry.
93  section 25 of the indian Patents act of 1970 (as amended by the Patents (amendment) act, 2005): opposition to grant of patent.
94  Janice M. Mueller (2007) ‘The Tiger awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of india’s Patent system and the rise of indian Pharmaceutical innovation’, 
University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 68(3), p. 570..
95  Jakkrit Kuanpoth (2006) ”Patents and access to Medicines in Thailand – the ddi case and beyond”, intellectual Property Quarterly, 12: 149-158.
96  see UnaiDs, UnDP, Who (2011) Using TRIPS flexibilities to improve access to HIV treatment, Policy Brief. available at:
http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/publications/hiv-aids/using-trips-flexibilities-to-improve-access-to-hiv-treatment.en
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Finally, competition law is another tool that may be used to increase access to treatment if hampered by anti-competitive 
practices, including – in some countries – excessive pricing. actions under competition law may be initiated by the govern-
ments themselves, competitors and, depending on local legislation, by patients and civil society. article 31(k) of the TriPs 
agreement enables compulsory licences to be granted on grounds of remedying anti-competitive abuses, such as excessive 
pricing, refusals to licence or the denial of an essential facility.97 a rare, but telling, example of the use of competition law in 
a developing country as a tool to increase access to medicines was a decision by the south african competition commis-
sion in 2003.98 it found that two pharmaceutical firms had abused their dominant position in the arV market by denying “a 
competitor access to an essential facility”.99
97  Brook K. Baker (2004) Processes and Issues for Improving Access to Utilise TRIPS Flexibilities in Non-Producing Countries,) DFiD health systems resource 
centre, london, p. 26.
98  The complaint to south africa’s competition commission in Hazel Tau and Others v. GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim arose when 11 complain-
ants (joined in February 2003 by a further two new complainants) brought an action against GlaxosmithKline (GsK) and Boehringer ingelheim (Bi). Bringing 
their action under section 49B(2)(b) of the south african competition act, which permits “any person” to “submit a complaint against an alleged prohibited 
practice”, the complainants alleged that, to the detriment of consumers, as prohibited by section 8(a) of the competition act, the two companies were act-
ing in violation of competition law by charging excessive prices for their arV medicines and were directly responsible for the premature, predictable and 
avoidable loss of life, including of people living with hiV, including both children and adults. Five of the 11 complainants were people living with hiV. on 16 
october 2003 the competition commission announced that it had decided to refer the complaint to the competition Tribunal for adjudication. The commis-
sion’s investigation had revealed that GsK and Bi had contravened the competition act of 1988 by refusing to licence their patents on arVs to generic manu-
facturers in return for a reasonable royalty. More specifically, GsK and Bi were found to have abused their dominant positions in their respective arV markets 
by engaging in restrictive practices consisting of: first, denying a competitor access to an essential facility; second, excessive pricing; and, third, engaging in 
an exclusionary act. according to the commission, GsK and Bi were using their exclusive patent rights to deny appropriate licences to other manufacturers, 
whilst simultaneously keeping their own prices high. on 10 December 2003, the competition commission announced that it had concluded a settlement 
agreement with GsK, resulting in the grant of non-exclusive, royalty-free voluntary licences, and that it was in discussions with Bi, also regarding a settlement 
agreement. see cPTech (2003) Competition Commission concludes an agreement with pharmaceutical firms, 10 December 2003: http://www.cptech.org/ip/
health/sa/cc12102003.html. see also, Tenu avafia, Jonathan Berger and Trudi hartzenberg (2006) The ability of select sub-Saharan African countries to utilize 
TRIPS flexibilities and competition law to ensure a sustainable supply of essential medicines: a study of producing and importing countries, tralac Working Paper no. 
12, tralac, stellenbosch.
99   see www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/documents/Mediarelease.doc. although the commission decided to refer the matter to the competition Tribunal for 
determination, the case was later settled as the firms accepted the grant of voluntary licences..
usInG TRIPs fLexIBILITIes To ATTAIn THe RIGHT To HeALTH: successes AnD cHALLenGes
27a n D i Ts  i M Pac T o n acc e s s To M e D i c i n e s a n D T h e r i G h T To h e a lT h
ncDs and the Doha Declaration
as already mentioned, the Doha Declaration confirmed the right of WTo Members to grant compulsory licences and the free-
dom to determine the grounds upon which such licences may be granted. in particular, the Declaration identifies public health 
crises related to hiV, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics as situations of national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency. 
importantly, the Doha Declaration does not provide a closed list of diseases. on the contrary, it is intended to be used as guid-
ance to address any public health need. in addition, WTo Members may themselves determine what constitutes “a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” Therefore, heart disease, diabetes, cancer or other ncDs may be sub-
ject to compulsory licences.
according to the MDG Gap Taskforce report, ncDs are responsible for no less than 40 percent of deaths in low-income coun-
tries.100 Thailand, for instance, took steps to address access to medicines for chronic diseases such as heart disease and cancer 
as discussed above. according to a White Paper issued by the Thailand Ministry of Public health in February 2008, cancer causes 
30,000 deaths in the country annually.101
The Thai constitution mandates the task of providing universal health care for the public, which includes the obligation to 
facilitate access to essential medicines. according to the Ministry of Public health’s White Paper, most of the new anti-cancer 
medicines are patented, expensive and inaccessible to middle-income and poor people in Thailand.102
From the point of view of the Thai government, cancer and cardiovascular diseases are no less serious than hiV or other infec-
tious diseases. although the international and Thai legal frameworks do not require prior negotiations with the patent owners, 
the Thai Ministry of Public health tried to reduce the gap between the public and the private postures before resorting to com-
pulsory licences to make the patented products available at prices that most people can afford.
Pursuant to its public health analysis of the need for medicines to treat ncDs, on 25 January 2007 the Thai Ministry of Public 
health granted compulsory licences on Plavix (marketed by Bristol-Meyers squibb), a drug used as a medication for cardiovascu-
lar disease. subsequently, in January 2008, the Thai government announced its decision to issue compulsory licences for three 
cancer medicines: docetaxel, used for the treatment of breast and lung cancer (sold as Taxotere® by sanofi aventis); erlotinib, 
used to treat lung cancer (sold as Tarceva® by roche); and letrozole, used to treat breast cancer (sold as Femara® by novartis).
100  United nations (2010) MDG Gap Task Force Report 2010: The Global Partnership for Development at a Critical Juncture, United nations publication, sales 
no. e.10.i.12, Un, new York.
101  see Ministries of Public health and national health security office of Thailand (2007) The ten burning issues related to the government use of patents on 
three patented essential drugs in Thailand. available at: http://www.moph.go.th/hot/White%20Paper%20cl-en.pdf.  
102  an official study in Thailand showed that, by using compulsory licences, the country could save almost 4 billion baht (Us$125 million) in 2008–2012 
through the use of cheaper generic medicines which are between four and 30 times cheaper than patented products. see sUns no. 6442 (2008) Recent Thai 
Compulsory Licenses and the Aftermath, sUns no. 6442, 27 March 2008. available at: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo20080401.htm.
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The grant of compulsory licences for ncDs in Thailand provoked criticism by the eU and the United states. in particular, the Us 
government made use of the special section 301 procedure to move Thailand from the status of ‘Watch list’ to ‘Priority Watch 
list’. on the other hand, Thai and international nGos and other forums representing patients groups have applauded the new 
government’s decision and urged Thailand and other countries to issue similar compulsory licences in the future.103
Thailand’s decision to issue compulsory licences for chronic ncDs hits at the heart of the global pharmaceutical industry’s profit 
model. cardiovascular ailments, cancer and diabetes are prevalent in developed countries, and the global pharmaceutical in-
dustry spends much of its research money to develop medicines to treat such diseases. The global pharmaceutical industry 
argues that the inclusion of ncDs in compulsory licensing could restrain research and development (r&D) for chronic diseases, 
which would bring fewer medicines to market. however, a massive use of such licences is unlikely, and, although the share of 
emerging economies will grow over time,104 developed countries currently account for an overwhelming proportion of the 
global pharmaceutical market. in any case, new r&D models should be considered to ensure that the price of new medicines is 
delinked from the cost of r&D and, therefore, they are made available at affordable prices. 
103  see, for instance, Knowledge ecology international statement on Thailand compulsory licenses on 25 January 2007: “Knowledge ecology internation-
al (Kei) applauds the decision by the Thailand Ministry of health to issue new compulsory licenses on patents for the aiDs drug Kaletra (lPV+rTV) and the 
heart disease drug Plavix (clopidogrel bisulfate). We expect that Thailand will issue other compulsory licences on medicines in the future.” available at: http://
www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/kei-thaicl-statement.html. 
104  see iMs institute for healthcare informatics (2011) The Global Use of Medicines: Outlook Through 2015 (May 2011). available at: http://www.imshealth.
com/deployedfiles/ims/Global/content/insights/iMs%20institute%20for%20healthcare%20informatics/Global_Use_of_Medicines_report.pdf.
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sustaining and scaling up treatment for 
the future: The Doha Declaration and Beyond
as mentioned above, there has been an impressive scale-up in hiV treatment since 2003. Despite the rapid scale-up of treat-
ment in the past decade or so, the sustainability of treatment is under threat – as patients move to newer and more expensive 
regimens, and funding the aiDs response flat-lines. it remains imperative that countries preserve policy space needed to regu-
late medicine prices including the use of the TriPs flexibilities, so as to promote competition and thereby reduce the price of 
the needed medicines, if patented.  
as already noted, a key flexibility is the implementation of rigorous standards to assess patent applications. This is a key flexibility 
that has not been sufficiently used to date and could be important for the future. lax standards lead to the proliferation of patents 
on minor, often trivial, developments that may be used by title-holders to discourage or exclude generic competition. a rigorous 
assessment105 and the timely rejection of a patent application that does not meet the patentability requirements may avoid the need 
to resort to compulsory licences or government use. The quality of patent examination may be significantly increased by an effective 
pre-grant and/or post-grant opposition system, whereby third parties provide examiners with evidence that may contribute to a 
thorough evaluation of applications.106 The effectiveness of such a system, in turn, may be enhanced by full transparency regarding 
the subject matter of the protected inventions. a recent study, for instance, has shown that patent applicants rarely indicate in the 
patent application the known generic name of a drug; this makes opposition and searches more difficult and costly.107 
Developments in india, which supplies the majority of developing countries’ essential medicines, will impact on the sustainabil-
ity of treatment for second- and third-generation medicines. a matter of concern is the acquisition of local generic companies 
by foreign companies that are likely to operate under different business models and interrupt or limit the supply of low-cost 
medicines for the indian and other developing countries’ markets. 
eU demands of TriPs-plus obligations in the FTa under negotiation with india, particularly in relation to data exclusivity and 
patent term extensions, have also raised concerns among patients’ civil society groups and some Un organizations.108
Patent incentives only work when rich markets exist; there is a chronic under-funding of r&D for diseases that prevail in devel-
oping countries, such as malaria and tuberculosis. in addition, patent strategies increasingly aim at blocking competition rather 
than seeking a reward for genuine innovations.109 Policies aimed at enhancing access to medicines in developing countries 
should include an increased use of competition laws to remedy patent-based anti-competitive practices.
105  see, for example, carlos correa (2006) Guidelines for the examination of pharmaceutical patents: developing a public health perspective, Working Paper, 
Who, icTsD, UncTaD and UnDP, Geneva. available at: http://www.emro.who.int/emp/media/pdf/patentability_guidelines.pdf.
106  Discussions on mechanisms to enhance the quality of patents have been proposed at the WiPo standing committee on Patents (scP). The africa 
Group and the Development agenda Group also submitted to its 15th session (May 2011) a proposal for a work programme on the topic ‘patents and health’. 
among other actions, it requests a study on the cost-benefit of the admissibility of ‘Markush claims’ (broad patent claims that may apply to a broad range 
of compounds). The scP may, thus, offer developing countries a forum to air concerns about the proliferation of patents of low or inexistent inventive activity.
107  carlos correa (2011) Pharmaceutical Innovation, Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing, research Paper no. 41, south centre, Geneva.
108  see, for example, Head of UNAIDS Warns Against Overly TRIPS-Plus IP Provisions in the India-EU Free Trade Agreement. available at: http://infojustice.org/
archives/4153.
109  see, for example, european commission (2009) Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report. DG Competition Staff Working Paper, european commission, Brus-
sels. available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/communication_en.pdf.
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Without prejudice to the use of TriPs flexibilities and other policy tools, longer-term responses are needed to increase treat-
ment of hiV and other diseases (including ncDs). such responses should be built on an iPrs system that exploits TriPs flex-
ibilities to facilitate local production of medicines, technology transfer, pooled procurement and other mechanisms aimed at 
increasing supply and reducing prices. in promoting local production, tensions between industrial policy and public policy 
objectives (promoting investment, job creation and local value added, as opposed to pursuing the most affordable treatment 
available) need to be reconciled.
another fundamental problem is the drying up of the r&D pipeline for arVs and other essential medicines. Despite advances in 
r&D tools and substantial funding, innovation in the pharmaceutical sector is declining. alternative models for increasing r&D 
focused on the needs of developing countries are necessary. They may include prizes, advanced purchase contracts and new 
institutional mechanisms, such as an international instrument for financing and coordination of pharmaceutical r&D. The Who 
has already started to consider these issues in the framework of its Global strategy and Plan of action.110  
in sum, the Doha Declaration has contributed significantly to providing legal clarity on the flexibilities contained in the TriPs 
agreement, and to provide some certainty on the space available to pursue public health policies while observing the agree-
ment’s substantive and enforcement provisions. however, much remains to be done to give full force to the Declaration and to 
develop other policies that ensure that access to medicines by all becomes a reality. Policy makers and legislators in developing 
and least-developed countries face important decisions and administrative challenges in terms of how best to meet their in-
ternational intellectual property obligations. These decisions include how to enforce iPrs while balancing adherence to obliga-
tions with use of the full range of flexibilities afforded under the TriPs agreement. Demand-driven and appropriate intellectual 
property-related technical assistance will facilitate greater use of these mechanisms. efforts to develop the capacity of low- and 
middle-income countries’ governments to comply with international iPr obligations while using the TriPs flexibilities to pro-
tect and fulfil the right to health, including as measures to redress anti-competitive practices, must continue and grow. 
as noted by former special rapporteur Paul hunt,111 the private business sector has human rights responsibilities. in particular, 
pharmaceutical companies, including originator, generic and biotechnology companies, have human rights responsibilities in 
relation to access to medicines.112 his guidelines note that companies should respect the rights of countries to use TriPs flex-
ibilities to the fullest extent possible to increase access to treatment, and should also negotiate and conclude non-exclusive 
voluntary licences with a view to increase access to medicines in developing countries and lDcs.113
110  an expert Working Group (eWG) on r&D financing and coordination was established in november 2008, but its report was not approved by the Who. 
a new expert group (the consultative expert Group on r&D financing and coordination – ceWG) is currently examining proposals on the subject. it has made 
a preliminary recommendation for starting negotiations on a binding instrument on r&D in the framework of the Who. available at: http://www.who.int/phi/
news/cewg_2011/en/.
111  see United nations (2008) Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical companies in Relation to Access to Medicines by Special Rapporteur on the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, United nations General assembly, a/63/263, 11 august 2008. avail-
able at:http://www.essex.ac.uk/human_rights_centre/research/rth/docs/Ga2008.pdf.  
112  ibid. Paragraphs (h) and (j) of the preamble.
113  ibid. Paragraphs 26–29 in particular. 
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concluding reflections 
While the Doha Declaration was essential in clarifying the right of WTo Member states to use public health-related TriPs flex-
ibilities to increase access to medicines, recent developments, in particular the proliferation of FTas, most of which contain 
intellectual property provisions that impact negatively on access to medicines, could impede the sustainability of treatment for 
hiV and related diseases. Furthermore, as the eligibility of treatment programmes for multilateral funding assistance from the 
Global Fund and other organizations decreases because of the global economic downturn, it will become increasingly impor-
tant for countries to use TriPs flexibilities to keep the cost of treatment sustainable. in addition, as more patients move onto 
improved, more efficacious and less toxic first-generation arVs as well as more expensive second- and third-generation arVs, 
it is anticipated that countries will need all policy options available to reduce cost and to sustain and scale up treatment.  
With these considerations in mind, developing countries that have not fully incorporated the TriPs flexibilities specifically 
geared to promote access to medicines should consider doing so without further delay. in particular, governments should 
ensure that procedures for pre- and post-grant patent opposition are available, and review the policies relating to the examina-
tion of pharmaceutical patents to avoid the proliferation of patents with low or inexistent novelty, inventive step and/or indus-
trial applicability. lDcs should refrain from granting pharmaceutical patents during the transitional period allowed under Doha 
Declaration and should seek to make the exception permanent after 2016. They should also remove any TriPs-plus language 
where it exists, and, where TriPs-plus commitments have been undertaken, should give a public health interpretation to these 
commitments to the fullest extent possible.
Both developed and developing countries with significant manufacturing capacity should encourage and facilitate where pos-
sible the transfer of technology between the global north and the global south for the production of arV medicines and 
other essential health products, and invest in regional and national production capacity in the pharmaceutical sector and in 
the development of local expertise.114 Developing countries and lDcs in particular should encourage regional cooperation to 
develop intellectual property and trade policies that promote innovation and that allow for the full use of the TriPs flexibilities 
to promote access to affordable hiV medicines and other medicines essential for hiV care and the treatment of opportunistic 
infections for all who need them.
Developing countries and lDcs negotiating trade agreements, as well as those involved in WTo accession negotiations, should 
not accept TriPs-plus provisions that could prove to impede access to treatment. 
114  see UnaiDs, UnDP Who, supra.
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rodrigo domingues
Abstract
access to medicines is a human right, enshrined in legally binding international human rights treaties, select regional agree-
ments and numerous national constitutions. The realization of access to medicines, including antiretroviral treatment, as part 
of the human right to health depends heavily on the legal framework for the production and distribution of medicines, includ-
ing intellectual property rights. The adoption of the agreement on Trade-related aspects of intellectual Property rights (TriPs 
agreement) within the framework of the World Trade organization (WTo) changed dramatically the international landscape 
with regard to intellectual property, particularly in relation to access to medicines. 
although one of the stated goals of the TriPs agreement was “to reduce tensions arising from intellectual property protection”, 
the possible conflict between such protection and essential public health objectives, particularly access to medicines, moved 
developing-country WTo Member states to request the council for TriPs to specifically consider the relationship between the 
TriPs agreement and public health in general, and access to medicines more specifically. after negotiations, in 2001 the 4th 
WTo Ministerial conference adopted the Declaration on the TriPs agreement and Public health.
This Discussion Paper briefly describes the content of the Doha Declaration and examines its implications for the realization of 
the right to health. The Paper discusses a number of repercussions of the Doha Declaration with regard to the international dis-
course on the right to health and access to medicines, and its implications within the WTo system and for national legislation. 
it presents some examples of use of the flexibilities confirmed by the Doha Declaration, and discusses the issue of compulsory 
licences with regard to patents relating to products for non-communicable diseases. Finally, a number of conclusions and rec-
ommendations are presented.
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